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2Abstract
 This study empirically finds the appropriate exchange rate regime for economic structure of 
Pakistan. To find long run association between exchange rate regime and its determinants; 
ARDL bond testing approach is concern however for the estimation of short run analysis Error 
correction model (ECM) is applied. Time series data is used over the period from 1984 to 2012. 
Findings reveal that Trade openness, foreign exchange reserves, rate of inflation and financial 
development are important determinant while choosing appropriate exchange-rate regime for 
economy having features like Pakistan. On the basis of analysis, this study suggests that both 
extreme ends hard peg and free float are unfavorable for it. Still, lot of attention is required on 
this topic. Choice of regime is a difficult task in empirical analysis because few factors cannot 
explain actual regime. 
JEL Classification: F31, F33, F44 
Key Words: Exchange Rate Regime, Classification, ARDL 
1. Introduction
After the down fall of Bretton Wood System1 most countries decided leave their exchange rate 
regime to float (Vuletin, 2004). Historical evidence suggests that a lot of literature2 has been 
devoted for choosing the appropriate exchange rate regime. Despite all the efforts, determination 
of exchange rate regime is still a question for the developing economies (Frankel, 1999). In the 
developing regions of the world, open economies are the most vulnerable ones, economic 
constructs are closely interrelated and exchange rate determination becomes a crucial decision. 
Because of the complexities of the open economies, an appropriate exchange rate regime has its 
influences on all other macroeconomic variables (Yagci, 2001).
1 A system in which different currencies were pegged to gold and IMF was given authority to intervene when 
imbalance of payments arose
2 Chang (1999), Fisher (2001), Frankel (1999 and 2003), Hoffman (2007) , Stockman (2003)
3 Analysis of the Global Economies has shown that a couple of developed states (United States, 
Australia, Canada, Germany, Japan and United Kingdom) adopted free float whereas few 
developed countries (Denmark, Switzerland, Ireland, Hungry and Hong Kong) have followed 
fixed regime from 1974 to 2001. Surprisingly the pattern of Gulf Countries (Bahrain, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, and Oman) has been quite stable and they have always adopted the fixed regime 
(Levy-Yeyati & Sturzenegger, 2001 and 2003). Unfortunately, the developing world is still 
looking for optimum choice of regime that may be suitable for economic improvement.  
According to (Frankel, 1999) one single regime cannot be considered beneficial for all countries 
even if they are similar in nature. Every country has its own economics structure, characteristics 
and economic preferences. So choice of exchange rate regime is a country-specific concept. It 
depends upon economic strength, degree of openness, trade volume, capital inflow, source and 
nature of economic disturbances (shocks), inflation history, financial development and policy 
objectives of the country (Yagci, 2001). Empirical literature has evidently shown that oil 
exporting countries are following fixed regime (Klein & Shambaugh, 2010). Their decision may 
be rational because they are exporting single commodity and their stages of financial 
development, capital inflow and policy objectives are same.
This particular study aims to make clear the mechanism of exchange rate regime determination 
by taking theoretical backing from Mundel-Flaming theory of optimal currency area (OCA). 
Mostly literature is developed in comparison of extreme ends of fixed and floating regime 
(Hoffmann, 2007) but doesn’t discuss managed float and intermediate regimes. This Paper is 
going to seek that Pakistan is natural candidate of fixed regime or float regime, if not then which 
range of exchange rate regime Pakistan should follow. Ranges of exchange rate regime remain 
between zero to one (0 to 1). Where zero and one are both extreme ends respectively free float 
and hard peg. In this study we used annual data of Pakistan over the 1984-2012 periods. 
2. Theoretical back ground
Theoretically, there are three main approaches available in the line of adoption favorable 
exchange rate regime. 
First, the Structural approach which focus characteristics of economic structure of country. This 
approach is based on theory of optimal currency area (OCA). Under fixed and flexible 
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on economic shocks that are caused by fluctuation in trade and deterioration in terms of trade 
(Mundell, 1961). Basically, these studies conclude size and nature of economic shocks and 
economic structure3 of country are main determinants of optimal regime (Frenkel, 1982). These 
studies suggest if domestic and foreign shocks are real in nature even foreign are nominal in 
nature this will shift the demand for domestic goods. But if economy is facing nominal domestic 
shocks, amendment in exchange rate is not required. 
Second, the credibility and flexibility approach (Pagano, 1988) discuss that the monetary 
authority has two options to capture trade-off between flexibility and credibility. They can either 
maximize utility function or minimize cost function. This framework is useful when monetary 
authority want to choose exchange rate regime between two extreme ends (fixed and flexible). 
Monetary authority develops a scenario where expected benefits and expected losses are 
compared. Flexible regime provides independent monetary policy and also provides flexibility to 
accommodate foreign and domestic shocks but impart a high level of credibility.
Third, the bipolar view suggests international capital flow is not sustainable when countries are 
using intermediate exchange rate regime. So countries should move to extreme range of 
exchange rate regimes (Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995).
2.1 Classification of regime
We will discuss here two type of classification of exchange rate regime
2.1.1 IMF Classification
Exchange rate regime is classified by International Monetary Fund in three categories for their 
members. First, Fixed or pegged (with a single currency or basket of currencies), second 
managed float (intermediate) and third is independent float.  These three categories are based on 
official exchange rate of members and also their policies and flexibilities about exchange rate. 
Whenever members make any change in their exchange rate they have to report IMF. The basic 
problem is when countries actually follow different (de-facto) to officially claim (de-jure). This 
increases the ambiguities in analysis of exchange rate regime and also reduces transparency, 
3 Economic structure describes output, unemployment, inflation, financial development exchange rate and 
governance situation of any economy. 
5effectiveness and performance of research policy. That’s why often exchange rate regime is 
found different from declared regime. Existence of inaccuracy in regime mislead monetary 
policy, after identifying this problem IMF constructed new classification that have all 
information about exchange rate, monetary policy and intention of policy on the basis of foreign 
reserves movement and actual exchange rate. 
2.1.2  Alternatives Classification
In 1999, IMF adopted new method to improve earlier classification but its practical usefulness 
was limited due to insufficient historical data. The flaws of this classification were empirically 
exposed when (Levy-Yeyati, 2001) identified 35 countries as free floaters but actually 12 of 
them were not found free floaters. These 12 countries are amongst the emerging markets. Calvo 
& Reinhart (2000) found many countries that were following hard peg regime arrangements but 
they had declared themselves as free floater. Bubula & Otker (2002) construct new classification 
on de-facto regime by using monthly database of all member countries. The sample period of this 
classification was limited (1990 to 2001) but this analysis was meaningful and interesting since it 
differs from Levy-Yeyati’s de-facto classification, which ignored official classification of 
International Monetary Fund (Darne & Ripoll-Bresson, 2004).
2.2 Literature Review
It’s become a tradition among economists, discussion on exchange rate and performance of fiscal 
policy based on Mundell-Flaming model and optimal theory (Mundell, 1960). That determines 
the desirable exchange-rate for economies of different characteristics. For example, if a country 
is categorized in small open economy, price shock is not its subject so fixed exchange rate 
regime is best for it. The traditional estimation was really useful in past, but nowadays it does not 
prove useful. It is evidence from history that decision of choosing exchange-rate regimes are not 
at once and ever, either willingly or unwillingly these are changed often (Vuletin, 2004).
A possible and reliable effect of the exchange-rate regime has been focusing more recently, 
emerging a trade-off between credibility and flexibility. There are four fields of study in 
economics that cover all theoretical discussion, and examine the relationship between fiscal 
performance and exchange regimes: Stabilization policies, “Dynamic stochastic models”, 
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market.
Bachetta et al (1999) for general equilibrium they used dynamic stochastic model in their paper. 
The study observes government expenditures and technological shocks under different regimes 
of exchange rate. Authors find that macroeconomic variables are affected not only under 
different exchange rates but also under monetary policy. 
The groups that follow stabilization polices (Masson, Goldstein, & Frenkel, 1991) there point of 
view is fixed exchange rate provide more discipline in fiscal policy than flexible exchange rate. 
A good fiscal policy leads to enhance reserves, these reserves become cause of fiscal extension 
and fiscal extension appreciates exchange rate. So fixed exchange rate is collapsed, history 
shows fixed exchange rate mostly fails to discipline fiscal policy and causes devaluation crisis 
(Vuletin, 2004).
Studies related to political economic issues (Alberola-Ila & Sanchez, 2001) express that there are 
hidden theoretical and empirical drawbacks in thoughts of conventional research papers on 
policy stabilization. Author mentions fiscal authority should spend more when it is socially 
advantageous. At fixed exchange rate, unstable policies deteriorate reserves and cause debt. And 
in flexible exchange rate unsound policies protect their self through variation in prices and 
exchange rate. So in this situation fiscal authority requests central bank to help. It is vital for 
central bank only pre-commit not to accommodate, except for short period.
The study related to financial crises (Chang, 1999) argued crises emerge in capital market due to 
“Bad policy” and “wrong predictions”. Bad policy augments debt burden, and fixed exchange 
rate becomes unsustainable under debt burden. So in this situation if economy wants to maintain 
fixed exchange rate it has to bear fixed cost of devaluation. Wrong prediction refers to public 
trust on different institutions and projects. If people get back all deposits in fear of bankruptcy a 
chain of disturbance occur in economic activities. So in this situation, keep exchange rate regime 
fixed become impossible for economies, definitely countries have to float their exchange rate 
regime.   
Every country differs from other in economic environments that is not clear yet which exchange 
rate regimes country should follow? Fischer (2008) indicate a period (1999 to 2006) in their 
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intermediate to floating exchanges. Frankel (2003) suggests in his study at the same time no 
single currency regime is beneficial. Husain et al (2005) recommends in developing countries 
relatively pegged exchange rate is better for policy implementation and also helped to maintain 
inflation at lower level. Another study (Berg et al 2000) indicates if a country has sustainable and 
flexible fiscal policy, international reserves and low capital mobility than fixed exchange rate is 
good for economy. And if the country has same economic conditions and economic shocks as its 
trade partners have, fixed exchange rate is appropriate otherwise flexible is good as it serve as a 
shocks absorber.
Open economy under flexible exchange rate considered as shocks absorber (Edwards, 2005), in 
situation of domestic over production economy enhance its exports by devaluation of its 
exchange. The economic literature postulates that macro-economic targets (inflation, output, 
economic growth) can be achieved by different exchange rate policies. There is also link 
between output and exchange rate, fixed exchange rate and low inflation attract investors and 
higher level of investment push economy at growing path. Here it is a key point if exchange rate 
is pegged at wrong level then resources could be misallocated. Another key point investment 
increased in economies with fixed exchange rate regimes but productivity and per capita growth 
also remains low as compare to flexible exchange rate (Ghosh et al.1997).
Hussain (2006) identifies important factors that affects exchange rate regime and also worked on 
choosing right regime for Pakistan. He used “Score card method” and compares economy of 
Pakistan with other 52 countries on the basis of size of economy, trade orientation, financial 
integration, fear of floating and macroeconomic stability. Paper finds the case against peg regime 
and concludes that Pakistan is not a natural candidate of fixed exchange rate regime. In policy 
recommendation this study recommends flexible exchange rate regime. 
Exchange rate regime effects the adjustment of fiscal policy, how countries handle and adjust 
financial, nominal, real shocks. Mostly countries face financial crises to follow fixed regime but 
this is proved theoretically that exchange rate has indirect effect on economic growth through 
investment and productivity. There is a series of connection that have direct and indirect effect 
on economic growth. However, fixed exchange rate build confidence and remove uncertainty 
8thus investment and productivity increased than trade and growth. Fixed exchange rate regime 
leads to currency overvalue in long run then investors start losing their confidence in economy.
 The countries with more stable and developed financial markets get benefits from flexible 
exchange rate regime in term of improving capability of adjusting real shocks, without scarifying 
economic stability that a credible fixed exchange rate may require. A study  (Stotsky et al. 2012) 
found strong relationship between non-agricultural growth and exchange rate regime. Author 
states in his paper that there is positive relationship between economic growth and flexible 
exchange rate in African countries but in some specification real exchange rate is significant. 
Over all, the paper suggests that appreciation is bad and overvaluation is damaging in non-
agricultural economies. It is true that exchange rate regime matter for growth but reforms 
packages more. 
Mostly economies are in effort of finding the rising inflation and its impacts on growth and also 
maintain appropriate exchange rate regime (Edwards, 2006). This is the dominant objective of 
economic policies. Numerous studies are in favor of fixed exchange rate because it helps to 
achieve low inflation. Normally expansion of fiscal policy builds pressure on economy and force 
inflation to increase but sometimes market structure play role in shocks absorbing. When prices 
raise markets reduce their profit margin and do not allow shocks to disturb exchange rate regime. 
We can wind up debate by saying; fixed exchange rate regime maintains low inflation and 
economic growth under the support of good market structure. (Stotsky et al., 2012)
Karass (2012) conducted an empirical study on 66 developing and developed economies study 
advocates that under fixed exchange rate regimes performance of fiscal policy is effective and 
ineffective under flexible exchange rate regimes. The reason behind is that under flexible 
exchange rate regimes government expenditure crowds out private investment.
Aliyav (2015) studies determinants of exchange rate regime in resource abundant and resource 
scarce countries by using multinomial logit regression. In this study data of 145 countries is used 
from 1975-2004. Findings point out that resource rich countries have more probability of having 
fixed regime and resource poor countries are less likely to have fix regime. Moreover, the author 
finds, independence of central bank and democracy has stronger and significant role in resource 
rich countries as compare to resource poor countries.  
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conditions, trade orientation, financial integration and level of development and also every 
country has different economic objectives to meet growth and welfare. So Pakistan should make 
individual decision to follow exchange rate regime by considering its economic condition and 
desired policy objectives instead of following other developing or developed countries.
3. Data Source and methodological frame work:
Sample contains 29 observation 1984 to 2012 annual data of Pakistan. The data on exchange rate 
attain from “Penn world table version 8.0 and IMF-IFS. While the data on real GDP, foreign 
exchange reserves, inflation, are attained from WDI and Pakistan Economic Survey international 
financial statistics. Data on fiscal budget deficit is collected from State bank of Pakistan website 
and data on financial openness (capital account openness) collected from Chinn-Ito website. 
3.1 Methodological frame work
Stationary test is the first step in econometric analysis. We can say a series is stationary if it has 
constant variance and its mean value should also be zero. If our series is not stationary then 
analysis is not valid the results would be called spurious regression. For example, if series has 
only two variables with decreasing or increasing trend over time; the regression result confirms 
with high value of R2 that both series are highly interconnected but actually they are totally 
unrelated. The outcome of unit root tests shows that all variables have different order to 
integration I(1) and I(0) so we will apply ARDL because of OLS is best if all variables are I(0)  
and Johansen  can be applied in case of only I(1) (Johansen, 1988 and 1991).
The functional relationship of variables is given under; 
𝑬𝑹𝑹𝒕 =  𝒂 +  𝜷𝟏𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒕 +  𝜷𝟐𝑻𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑵𝒕 +  𝜷𝟑𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒕 +  𝜷𝟒𝑲𝒂𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 +  𝜷𝟓 𝑭𝑩𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕  +  𝑼𝒕
Where, ERRt denotes exchange rate regime at time particular time t) and a is intercept term βetas 
are coefficients of variables, Size stands for size of economy (real gdp), Toppen stands for trade 
openness and liberalization, Inf refers inflation rate, KaOpen (capital account openness) is used 
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as proxy of financial openness, Fbgdp is the proxy of fiscal shocks to economy and U for error 
term. 
3.2 Estimation Technique:
For long run relationship between Exchange rate regime and its predictors is found by ARDL 
bound testing approach by following the given equation;
𝒅𝑬𝑹𝑹𝒕 = 𝒃𝟏𝟏 + 𝒃𝟏𝟐(𝑬𝑹𝑹)𝒕 ‒ 𝟏 + 𝒃𝟏𝟑(𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒕 ‒ 𝟏 + 𝒃𝟏𝟒(𝑳𝑻𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑵)𝒕 ‒ 𝟏 + 𝒃𝟏𝟓(𝑰𝑵𝑭)𝒕 ‒ 𝟏 + 𝒃𝟏𝟔(𝑲𝒂𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒏)𝒕 ‒ 𝟏+ 𝒃𝟏𝟕𝑭𝑩𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕 ‒ 𝟏 + 𝒃𝟏𝟐 𝒏∑
𝒊 = 𝟎𝒅(𝑬𝑹𝑹)𝒕 ‒ 𝒊 + 𝒃𝟏𝟑 𝒏∑𝒊 = 𝟎𝒅(𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬)𝒕 ‒ 𝒊 + 𝒃𝟏𝟒 𝒏∑𝒊 = 𝟎𝒅 (𝑳𝑻𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑵)𝒕 ‒ 𝒊   + 𝒃𝟏𝟓 𝒏∑
𝒊 = 𝟎 𝒅(𝑰𝑵𝑭)𝒕 ‒ 𝒊 + 𝒃𝟏𝟔 𝒏∑𝒊 = 𝟎𝒅(𝑲𝒂𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒏)𝒕 ‒ 𝒊 + 𝒃𝟏𝟕 𝒏∑𝒊 = 𝟎 𝒅(𝑭𝑩𝑮𝑫𝑷)𝒕 ‒ 𝒊 + 𝝁𝟏𝟏
In the above equation i ranges indicates chosen lag length
Symbolize as operator of first difference 𝑑 
 is the drift component and  is random term 𝛼11  𝝁𝟏𝟏
3.3 Construction of dependant variable
Exchange rate is amount of one currency in terms of other currency. In other words units of one 
currency (Rs) we can exchange to get one unit of other currency ($) is called nominal exchange 
rate. Exchange rate regime is setting of nominal exchange rate that is decided by central bank 
either nominal exchange rate is automatically chosen by demand and supply of currency or it is 
fixed at any point by central authority. Here we use de-facto (opposite of de-jure) classification 
of exchange rate regime by Eduardo Levy- Yayati and Federico Sturzenegger (Levy-Yeyati, 
2003).
Most of the studies on Exchange rate regimes have been used Dummy variable for exchange rate 
regimes eg ,  zero for fixed and one for flexible. But Exchange rate regime cannot be exact ‘’ 
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zero or one’’ it may be between these two extremes. In this study we attempt to convert data set 
in frictions (from zero to one) we put one for fixed and zero for flexible. So we can easily decide 
which regime country is following eg; Pakistan and United States both are using de jure flexible 
Exchange rate regimes. So question is this how can we differentiate their level of flexibilities? 
 In our model we can easily solve this problem. We converted data in friction by using idea of 
“Karras (2012)”. For example According to his data set the value for USA is 0.10 in 2013 and 
value for Pakistan is 0.24 in same years it means both countries are following flexible Exchange 
rate regimes difference is this US following 10 percent fixed or 90 percent flexible and 0.24 
means Pakistan is following 24 percent fixed or 76 percent flexible (because of zero means ‘’ 
100 percent’’ flexible”
We used monthly average data of Exchange rate. If nominal Exchange rate (PKR/$) is same as 
previous and next month we put “ 1 ‘’ ( fixed) if current, previous and next value is not same 
then we put “ 0” (flexible)  then find average value that will indicate Exchange rate regimes for 
specific year (Karras 2012).
4. Results and discussions
Table – 1: Descriptive Stat
Name of 
Variables ERR LSIZE LOPPEN INF LFER KaOpen FBGDP
Mean  0.618035  6.372325  0.345383  8.497174  0.674129 -1.211838 -2.334483
Std. Dev.  0.217982  0.174531  0.027097  3.958215  0.270353  0.130217  2.765382
Skewness -0.944168 -0.007421 -0.298005  0.719759 -0.764964 -5.102520  0.645222
Kurtosis  3.184572  2.069192  2.693171  3.646957  2.648655  27.03571  4.096676
Jarque-Bera  4.649848  1.119389  0.542990  3.217238  3.182824  823.9123  3.465434
Probability  0.097791  0.571383  0.762239  0.200164  0.203638  0.308614  0.176803
Sum  19.15909  197.5421  10.01611  263.4124  20.89801 -35.14331 -67.70000
Sum Sq. Dev.  1.425479  0.913832  0.020558  470.0240  2.192723  0.474778  214.1255
Observations 29 29 29  29  29  29  29
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Data series should be normally distributed is the first step of econometric analysis. In descriptive 
statistics, we analyze the values of Jarque Bera test; the value of variables has found to be 
insignificant it means all data series are normally distributed. And also the estimated values of 
Kurtosis and Skewness indicate the normality of data.  Stationarty of data is also required for 
valid analysis. There are four popular tests that can be applied to check unit root in data series.  
ADF, Phillips-Perron (PP) and KPSS these all test are equally valid for unit root. These tests 
actually reports about integration order of variables. In this study, we used ADF test that 
concludes order of integration is mixed. We find that the variable of inflation, foreign exchange 
reserve and capital account openness on level and remaining variables found to be stationary at 
1st difference. So when we find I (0) and I (1) order of integration then we apply Auto Regressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL). Output of unit root tests are given in Table – 2.
Table – 2:  Statistics of ADF
Intercept Intercept & TrendName of
Variables t-Stat Prob. t-Stat Prob.
𝑬𝑹𝑹𝒕 -5.348013** 0.0018 -5.552009** 0.0005
𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒕 -3.521759** 0.0145 -3.477914** 0.0608
𝑳𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑵𝒕 -2.744482** 0.0790 -6.752136* 0.0000
𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒕 -3.905330* 0.0068 -3.821596* 0.0330
𝑳𝑭𝑬𝑹𝒕 -6.353556* 0.0000 -6.250032* 0.0001
𝑲𝒂𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 -5.291503* 0.0000 -5.188035* 0.0013
𝑭𝑩𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕 -4.353594** 0.0002 -4.260462** 0.0003
Note: * is indication of having stationary on level and ** indicates having  stationary on first difference
4.2 Optimal Lag Length 
After checking the stationary of series, we have to see optimal lag length. Optimal lag length 
indicates that how many lag should be use in model. The results of above table shows three lag 
should be used in model.
13
Table – 3: Optimal Lag Length
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 -22.92365 NA  2.00e-08  2.137403  2.470454  2.239220
1  93.23331   165.9385*   1.85e-10*  -2.659522*   0.004887*  -1.844986*
 
* indicates lag order selected by the criterion
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)
 FPE: Final prediction error
 AIC: Akaike information criterion
 SC: Schwarz information criterion
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion
We select optimal lag for our model on the on the basis of lowest value of H-Q Criterion. After 
selecting lag length criteria, we evaluate long term dynamics of variables under consideration.  
Table – 4: ARDL Bounds Testing Approach
Estimated Models
𝑬𝑹𝑹𝒕 = 𝒇(𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒕,𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕,𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒕, 𝑭𝒆𝒓𝒕, 𝑲𝒂𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕,𝑭𝑩𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕)
Optimal lags (1,0,0,0,0,0,0)
Statistics  for W     28.4872 *
Statistics  for F         4.0696 *   
Critical Bounds For F–  Statistics Critical Bounds For W – Statistics
Significance 
Level
Lower 
Critical 
Bound
Upper Critical 
Bound
Lower Critical 
Bound
Upper Critical
 Bound
5 per cent 3.0274          4.5846          21.1915         32.0925         
10 per cent 2.5055          3.8412 17.5385         26.8881
DIAGNOSTIC TESTS
Serial Correlation 1.7289[.189]  R2 .54368    
 Functional Form .10935[.741]  Adjusted - R2 .38397 
Normality 7.7463[.021]  F – Statistics 3.4042 
Heteroscedasticity .49442[.482]   DW – Statistic                  2.2808   
Asterisks are the indication of significance of values, ***, **, and *, and show significance at 1%; 5% and 10% levels 
respectively. The Probability Values are given in { } brackets   
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After lag length criteria, now we are going to explore long run relationship among exchange rate 
regime and its determinants by using latest co-integration approach. As the null hypothesis of the 
test is “No co-integration” and it only be rejected only if calculated value of F- statistics is higher 
than upper critical bound value. The above Table reveals that the calculated value of F-statistics 
higher than its upper critical bound at 10% level of significance: 4.06 > 3.84 so the null hypothesis 
is rejected and alternative hypothesis has been accepted and value of W- statistics is also higher than 
its upper critical Bound at 10% level of significance:  28.48 > 26.88. It means the model has long-
run relationship, in other words, exchange rate regime has stable and long run link with 
independent variables. The diagnostics reveal that there is no problem with Heteroscedasticity 
and the error term is normally distributed. Serial correlation and the functional form of model are 
also correct.
Table – 5: Long Run and Short Run Dynamics
Estimated Long Term Coefficients
using the ARDL Approach
Error Correction Representation
for the Selected ARDL Model
Dependant Variable:𝑬𝑹𝑹𝒕 Dependant Variable:∆𝑳𝑬𝑹𝑹𝒕
Name of Variables Coefficient P-value Name of Variable Coefficient P-value
𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒕 -.28665 [.341] 𝒅𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒕 -.26393 [.353]
𝑳𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑵𝒕 .28779 [.073]* 𝒅𝑳𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑵𝒕 .26498 [.052]*
𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒕 -.064476 [.024]** 𝒅𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒕 -.059365 [.021]**
𝑳𝑭𝑬𝑹𝒕 .89984 [.024]** 𝒅𝑳𝑭𝑬𝑹𝒕 .82852 [.017]**
𝑲𝒂𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 -.18183 [.532] 𝒅𝑲𝒂𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 -.16742 [.524]
𝑭𝑩𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕 .023024 [.283] 𝒅𝑭𝑩𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕 .021199 [.240]
C 1.2280 [.564] 1-tECM -.92074 [.000]***
Diagnostics for ECM
R-squared .69685
Mean Dependent 
Variable -.0089286
Adjusted R-squared .59074
S.D. Dependent 
Variable .26995
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ARDL (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) selected based on Schwarz Bayesian Criterion
All variables except exchange rate regime and inflation are taken in Natural logarithmic form. 
 is dependent variable, while , , ,   are 𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑡 𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡 𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑡 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡,𝐿𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑡 𝐾𝑎𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐹𝐵𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
independent variables. Long run and short run results are given below:
The results show that coefficient of openness of economy is positively related to exchange rate 
regime and its impact on regime selection is statistically significant. Positive sign of openness 
push regime towards fixed because in this study “1” indicates fixed and “0” stands for flexible 
regime same as Karass (2012). The magnitude of coefficient shows that one percent change in 
openness push economy 0.287 percent in favor of fixed regime. So as the magnitude of 
coefficient is strong it would have more influence on exchange rate regime determination. Our 
results match with Aliyev (2015), (Walker, 2003), (Worrell et al 2000), Leblang (1999) and 
Malvin (1985). 
The coefficient of SIZE of economy is negative but statistically insignificant. It does not matter 
whether it has large size of economy or small that can determine the exchange rate regime. The 
magnitude of coefficient is also very small; it can be interpreted as one percent change in size of 
economy can change 0.286 percent towards fixed regime.  However, size of economy influences 
the exchange rate and also matter for regime determination. In case of other developed countries 
number of studies support this negative relationship for instance Aliyev (2015), (Walker, 2003), 
(Worrell et al 2000), and Malvin (1985). These findings of Size and openness are consistent with 
theory of optimal currency area (OCA).   
S.E. of Regression .17270
Akaike Information 
Criterion 6.1546
Sum Squared 
Residual .59647
Schwarz Bayesian 
Criterion .82583
Log Likelihood 14.1546 Durbin-Watson Stat 2.2808
F-statistic 6.5676
Prob. Value (F-
statistic)
[.000]
*; **, and *** reveals significance level of test statistic at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
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Inflation is negative and statistically significant. Coefficient indicates one percent increase in 
inflation force exchange rate regime change 0.064 percent in flexible direction. It is difficult to 
maintain stable exchange rate regime under higher consumer prices. In flexible regime countries 
have to bear increasing inflation rate but if an economy requires low inflation rate than country 
has to adopt fixed exchange rate regime. If a country has historically experienced of high 
inflation than it can get benefit from peg (Yagci, 2001) but weak central bank faces many 
hurdles in maintaining inflation at low level. According to “Hussain” (2006) on average Pakistan 
didn’t face high inflation it remains between 8 to 10 percent. This situation is against fixed 
regime. Studies such as Aliyev (2015), (Worrell et al 2000) and Melvin (1985) support negative 
sign of inflation but contrast with Leblang (1999).
The coefficient of foreign exchange reserve is positive and statistically significant. Magnitude of 
coefficient is very strong. We can interpret as one percent increase in FER will push regime 
0.899 percent towards fixed. In other words we can say country with more foreign exchange 
reserves, more probability to adopt fixed regime. In case of Pakistan, regime is highly influenced 
by foreign exchange reserves. Literature suggests if country has high ratio of foreign exchanges 
to GDP than fixed exchange rate regime is preferable otherwise opposite is best. Pakistan is not 
rich in exchange reserves it often borrows from international monetary fund (IMF) and World 
Bank to fulfill its demand so fixed is not preferable for Pakistan.
Capital account openness measures inflow and out flow of money and other financial assets, 
where as the surplus of KaOpen means inflow and deficit of KaOpen means out flow of financial 
resources. Here Capital account openness appears with insignificant and negative coefficient, for 
this analysis it means financial openness (KaOpen) is not affecting choice of exchange rate 
regime, but the negative sign having indication toward flexible. 
Interestingly, Long run and short run dynamics are qualitatively same .These three variables
, and   are significant in short run. In short run, our main focus is the  𝑑𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝑁𝑡 𝑑𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡  𝑑𝐿𝐹𝐸𝑅𝑡
value of ECM which is significant and negative as required. The coefficient authenticate that 92 
percent of the divergence will converge to equilibrium in one year.  The value of R square is 0.69 
in long run result which indicates our independent variables are able to explain 69 percent 
variation in dependent variable. In other sense we can interpret as the weightege of our 
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independent variables is 69 percent to choose exchange rate regime under economic structure of 
Pakistan.
4.3 Diagnostic of CUSUM and CUSUM squares
 Stability test
Stability of long run coefficient has been shown with the help of cumulative sum of recursive 
residuals (CUSUM) of cumulative sum of squares recursive residuals (CUSUM SQUARE) test.
Fig– 1:
Fig– 2: 
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The diagnostics of CUSUM and CUSUM squares confirm the stability of our model. The above 
figures (1 and 2) show model got stability at 5 percent level. Here we are happy about the 
CUSUM and CUSUM squares because estimated lines are in the given limit of upper and lower 
critical lines. On the other hand if estimated lines positioned out of critical bounds then our 
model is not stable. So, now it is clear graphically that there exist long run and stable link 
between exchange rate regime and its determinants that are used in this study. We can conclude 
as; the function of exchange rate regime is stable for Pakistan over the estimated period. In other 
words, there is no structural break in model; policy maker can use it for policy options. 
5.  Conclusion
This study has empirically analyzed; economic, financial and political determinants of exchange-
rate regime in Pakistan over the period of 1984 to 2012. We use “Auto Regressive Distributed 
Lagged” approach for empirical estimation. In line with other studies, we also confirmed that 
openness, foreign exchange reserves, rate of inflation and financial development are important 
determinant of exchange-rate regime for economy having features like Pakistan.
Our empirical findings suggest that appropriate regime for Pakistan is managed fixed exchange-
rate regime4 but not peg. It should be near to intermediate because in our study not all variables 
give indication of hard peg or free float. Both extreme ends: peg and free float are unfavorable 
for it. Openness and foreign exchange reserves are in favor of regime towards fix but at the same 
time inflation appears with negative sign, it is the indication towards flexibility. The results are 
alike Asim (2006) as his study also informs that peg (hard fix) is not suitable for economy with 
4  This study suggests managed fix exchange rate regime on the basis of estimated coefficient and their signs. As we 
assume zero for flexible regime and one for fixed regime, the coefficient appears with negative sign is indication of 
more likelihood to fixed regime, see the (Aliyev 2015). 
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Pakistan’s characteristics and increase in regime flexibility would likely to improve its economic 
performance.
In our study governance and political stability found insignificant but appear with right sign that 
stands for flexibility. It means political institutions play important role in adoption of exchange-
rate regime but in Pakistan they are not as important as economic institutions. “Aliyev” (2015) 
use democracy to capture political influence on exchange rate regime, his study supports flexible 
regime in resource rich country and study also specify that democratic countries have more 
probability of flexible exchange rate regime, doesn’t matter they are resource rich or resource 
poor economies.
Policies and regime are interlinked; if economic policies are suitable then regime choice may 
lose its importance. Choice of regime is difficult task in empirical analysis because few factors 
cannot explain actual regime, for example, it is quite possible that some variables recommend 
flexible regime is suitable for a particular country and other factors may argue that flexible is 
inappropriate. Economic, financial and political situation of every country changes over the time 
that’s why decision of exchange rate regime is not once and permanent. Study of Vuletin, (2004) 
supports our argument that decision of choosing right exchange-rate regime is not at once and 
ever, either willingly or unwillingly these are changed often.
It is confirmed that economic theories are not sufficient to give confirm answer to policy makers 
in prediction of appropriate regime. And there is no single theoretical approach that can claim of 
its victory and superiority over another (Ouchen 2013). Some studies find support from OCA 
approach and others acquire evidence from “Bipolar view and Trade off” (Fisher, 2001). The 
choice of appropriate exchange-rate regime is not clear-cut; it is much complicated, continuous 
revision is required in empirical and theoretical studies.
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Table – 2 Variables and Transformation
Variables Names of the Variables Transformation
Data 
Source Data Range
𝑬𝑹𝑹𝒕 Exchange Rate 
Regime  [ See Karass 2012]
PWT 8.0
and IFS
1984 – 2012
𝑳𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒕 Size of Economy LN [Real GDP] WDI [2013] 1984 – 2012
𝑳𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑵𝒕 Trade Openness
LN[Imports +Exports/Real 
GDP] WDI [2013] 1984 – 2012
𝑰𝑵𝑭𝒕 Inflation Consumer Price Index WDI [2013] 1984 – 2012
𝑳𝑭𝑬𝑹𝒕
Foreign Exchange 
Reserves
LN [Foreign Exchange 
Reserves Gold excluded] WDI [2013] 1984 – 2012
𝑲𝒂𝑶𝒑𝒆𝒏𝒕 Capital  account 
openness Ito-Chin Methodology
Ito-Chin  
[2013] 1984 – 2012
𝑭𝑩𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒕 Fiscal Shocks [Fiscal Budget Deficit to GDP] SBP 1984 – 2012
